Introduction
Canada's economy has always depended heavily on foreign direct investment. Perhaps dependence breeds resentment, because throughout Canada's history foreign investment has been welcomed only reluctantly.
1 Suspicion of investment by state-owned enterprises is only the latest chapter in this history. 2 On December 7, 2012, the Government of Canada begrudgingly approved the takeovers of two Canadian oil sands companies, Nexen Inc. and Progress Energy Resources Corp., by two foreign state-owned enterprises, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Malaysia's PETRONAS, respectively. On the same day, the Government announced new guidelines for reviewing investments by state-owned enterprises and a new policy that further takeovers of oil sands companies by such enterprises would be approved only in "exceptional" circumstances.
3
There are a number of troubling aspects to the Government's position. It ignores the important role state-owned enterprises such as Norway's Statoil, Abu Dhabi's National Energy Company and PetroChina Investment Co. have played in the Canadian oil industry, and the role they 2 could play in the future. 4 It also appears to ignore the interests of Canada's own public-sector pension funds, which are investing an increasing percentage of their assets abroad, sometimes in industries that carry foreign ownership restrictions or are publicly owned in Canada. 5 Apart from the possible economic impacts, in the era of government bail-outs and large public-sector investment funds, the distinction between state ownership and private ownership may be a poor basis for public policy, particularly in the area of foreign investment.
The paper will proceed as follows. Part I provides a brief general backgrounder on the Canadian foreign investment review process under the Investment Canada Act, including the "net benefit" test. Part II focuses on foreign direct investment ("FDI") by state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). 6 Section A reviews the concerns the Canadian Government and others have expressed regarding FDI by SOEs. Section B discusses how state ownership will affect the Government's assessment as to whether a reviewable investment satisfies the net benefit test. Section C questions the logic of distinguishing between SOEs and privately-owned acquirers in its foreign direct investment review process.
I. Background
A.
Overview of the Foreign Investment Review Process
The Investment Canada Act ("Act") provides for review by the Minister of Industry of proposed investments that would result in an acquisition of control of a Canadian business valued above a threshold amount. 7 A non-Canadian is prohibited from implementing an investment subject to review under the Act unless "the Minister is satisfied…that the investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada." 8 The terms "Canadian business" and what will constitute an acquisition of control are defined in the Act; the thresholds are set by the Act and its regulations. But to foreign governments, the difference might be academic, especially if they are seeking retribution for their own investments' being blocked in Canada."). 6 I focus narrowly in this paper on state-owned enterprises. Although sovereign wealth funds have attracted similar concerns and suspicions, their intention is not necessarily to take over the management of the Canadian businesses in which they invest. 7 In the interests of clarity and brevity, this overview focuses on how the Act applies to takeovers of or significant investments in Canadian businesses. In other words, the description here will assume the application of the Act to a proposed foreign investment and ignore the various exemptions. Generally, the exemptions apply to the taking of ownership interests by financial institutions that occur by reason of the institution realizing on a security interest, or by reason of a corporation's bankruptcy. 8 Investment Canada Act, RSC 1985, c. 28, ss. 16 and 24.
"Canadian business" means "a business carried on in Canada that has a place of business in Canada, an individual or individuals in Canada who are employed or self-employed in connection with the business, and assets in Canada used in carrying on the business". 9 Under this definition, the category of investments subject to review is not restricted to Canadianowned businesses.
The Act also sets out what will constitute an acquisition for control, which makes an investment reviewable under the Act. A foreign investor will be acquiring control, for the purposes of the Act, when the investor acquires a majority of the voting shares of a corporation carrying on business in Canada; a majority of the voting interests in an entity that carries on business in Canada or controls another entity carrying on business in Canada; or all or substantially all of the assets of a Canadian business. 10 A transaction is presumed to be an acquisition for control if the foreign investor is acquiring one-third or more of the voting shares in a corporation, unless the investor can prove that they will not control the Canadian business upon acquiring the voting shares.
11
On December 7, 2012, the Minister announced that the Government will "progressively" increase, over the next four years, to $1 billion the value thresholds for reviewable investments applicable to WTO members. This new threshold, however, will not apply to SOEs, for which the existing threshold of $330 million will remain in place. 12 To give this threshold some context, the Nexen-CNOOC deal was valued at $15.1 billion Canadian dollars and the Progress Energy-PETRONAS deal at $6 billion. 13 The threshold for non-WTO members will remain $5 million.
14
The way that the value of a transaction will be calculated under the Act will also change from asset value to enterprise value to "capture the increasing importance of the service and knowledge-based industries" to the Canadian economy. 4 revised wording of the purpose statement implies that foreign investments in Canada will be reviewed solely for possible "injurious" impacts on national security, 17 the "net benefit" test for foreign investments, discussed further below, has not been changed.
18
The review process under the Act has been criticized extensively inside and outside Canada as a potential barrier to much-needed foreign investment. 19 Many have argued for greater transparency of the process, 20 including the publication of reasons for the Minister's decision to allow or to reject an investment. 21 A number of commentators have suggested that this lack of transparency has helped to create the impression that Canada is hostile to foreign investment, 22 and that the process is highly politicized. In 2010, the Canadian Government blocked a hostile takeover bid for Potash Corporation by BHP Billiton, a privately-owned, publicly-listed Australian corporation, on the basis that the takeover was not "likely to be of net benefit to Canada." 23 In accordance with standard practice, no reasons for this decision were issued, 24 but it is widely assumed that the federal government was responding to the vocal opposition of the Premier of Saskatchewan. 25 This decision and the surrounding circumstances reinforced concerns regarding politicization of the review process and increased calls for greater transparency.
B. The "Net Benefit" Test
The most obvious manifestation of Canada's suspicion of foreign investment is found in the Act's "net benefit" test for approving inward foreign investments. In order for a reviewable investment to receive approval, the Minister must be satisfied that the investment will be of "net benefit" to Canada. 26 The Act imposes a 45 day time limit on the Minister to make this decision, once all of the required information has been received from the foreign investor.
27
According to Industry Canada Guidelines, "[a]n investment will be determined to be of net benefit when the aggregate net effect is positive, regardless of its extent." 28 The burden is on the foreign investor to prove to the Government that its investment will create a net benefit to Canada.
29
Section 20 of the Act sets out the "factors" that the Minister is to take into account, "where relevant", in assessing whether a reviewable investment is a net benefit to Canada:
(a) the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian business or new Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the Canadian business or new Canadian business forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries in Canada;
(e) the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and cultural policies, taking into consideration industrial, economic and cultural policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the investment; and (f) the contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world markets.
"Canadian" is defined in the Act as a Canadian citizen, permanent resident who has been eligible to apply for citizenship for less than one year, a Canadian government or government agency, or a Canadian-controlled entity. 30 In determining whether an investment constitutes a net benefit in the aggregate, relevant factors will be looked at individually, with any negative impacts weighed against positive ones.
31
In the review process, foreign investors may offer, or the Government may prompt them to offer, "undertakings" that will be taken into account by the Minister in assessing net benefit.
32
The foreign investor also has 30 days to offer undertakings after notice has been given that the Minister is not satisfied that a proposed investment meets the net benefit test. 33 In order to obtain government approval of its takeover of Stelco, US Steel gave undertakings to maintain certain levels of employment and production in Canada. Usually, the specifics of these undertakings are not made public, 34 and, until recently, the provisions in the Act providing for the enforcement of these undertakings had never been used. 35 In 2009, however, the Government launched a law suit against US Steel for breach of its undertakings after US Steel laid off over 2,000 Canadian workers. The merits of the Canadian Government's claim have yet to be decided.
Generally, the net benefit test can be read as an assertion of central government management over the Canadian economy out of concern that foreign investment may not result in the social benefits predicted by economic theory without help from the guiding hand of government. In other words, the test's underlying assumption is that foreign investment does not necessarily produce a net social benefit, but rather will produce such a benefit only when screened and, in some cases, certain conditions imposed. The list of factors to be assessed to determine net benefit attempt to address specific domestic concerns regarding foreign investment, including loss of employment and the relocation of head offices and research and development.
Many Canadian critics view the list of factors in section 20 as unnecessarily arbitrary and subjective, 36 and "vague, elusive and contradictory". 37 On the other hand, one commentator has argued that it provides "broadly objective factors…not adequately defined or sufficiently precise but nonetheless generally stated as legal criteria. in a greater number of rejections. 39 Some authors have suggested that the Government publish more regulations and guidelines to help increase consistency and predictability in the application of the test. 40 The main problem with the test may be that it requires the Government to assess each proposed investment in isolation, whereas the "net benefit" of foreign investment is seen clearly in the aggregate. In any corporate reorganization, some jobs may be lost or moved, some R&D relocated. The evidence appears to show, however, that the aggregate effect of foreign investment on the Canadian economy has been a net positive one.
II. Foreign Investment by State-owned Enterprises
Canada's Concerns Regarding FDI by SOEs
Canadians' concerns regarding FDI are both general and specific to investment by SOEs. Generally, there has always been a fear that takeovers by foreign investors will "hollow out" corporate Canada by moving head offices elsewhere, leaving us mere 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. 41 Although hard evidence of this perceived "hollowing out" is hard to come by, 42 concerns were heightened in the last few years by "a series of rapidly concluded foreign takeovers" by some iconic Canadian corporations, including Inco Ltd. (by Brazil's Vale) and Falconbridge Corp. (by Swiss-based Xstrata). 43 As noted above, the Canadian Government rejected a bid by BHP Billiton for Saskatchewan-based Potash Corporation after loud protests from the Saskatchewan provincial government and the Canadian public. Most recently, reaction to a proposed merger between the London Stock Exchange and TMX, which owns the Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange was swift and primarily negative. TMX was purchased instead by the appropriately named Maple Group Acquisitions Corp., a consortium of Canadian banks and public-sector pension fund managers.
The primary concern regarding FDI by SOEs is that SOEs will not operate on a commercial basis; rather, decisions will be based on the interests of the SOE's home government, and that these interests will be contrary to Canada's own policies or interests. 44 There are also vaguely worded said, Wang also notes that the "main task" of SOE managers "is maintaining and increasing the value of the state-owned assets", and that managers will be evaluated based "strictly" on performance. Although "performance" includes other factors, it is based primarily on profitability. 48 In addition to a lack of evidence supporting this concern, 62 it is difficult to understand why it would be a concern at all. In Canada, extraction companies do not own the natural resource; rather, the province retains ownership of the resource and sells only the extraction rights. Although the provincial government's ability to cut off extraction completely may be governed by trade and investment law regarding expropriation, it nonetheless retains the ability to control and to regulate extraction. 63 This includes the ability to assess royalties based on market price. An SOE that chose "to preferentially ship oil to its home state…would face the opportunity cost of doing so", 64 trading off the benefits of greater profits against the benefits of cheap access to oil, although this trade off may be one that Chinese SOEs are willing to make. Such a move might still be prevented by "Canadian transfer pricing rules" which "are designed specifically to 55 VanDerMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note 41 at 402. See also Mandel-Campbell, supra note 1 at 24 ("Norway's government pension fund…largely conforms to Western governance standards"); Cornish, ibid at 14 ("This suggests that the significant issue is their geopolitical distance rather than their ownership status.") and 17. 56 Cornish, ibid at 10. 57 Ibid at 14. 58 The American Government has expressed some displeasure regarding significant acquisitions by Chinese SOEs in "America's backyard": ibid at 14. 59 VanDerMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note 41 at 398. 60 VanDuzer, supra note 20 at 251-52. 61 Singer & Walker, supra note 44 at 23. See also VanDerMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note 41 at 401 ("resource hoarding"); Cornish, supra note 44 at 11. 62 Cornish, ibid at 11. 63 Steger, supra note 36 at 12; Josh Wingrove, "Alberta pleased over Nexen, Progress approval, cautiously eyes limits on future takeovers" Globe and Mail, 7 December 2012, online: http://www.globeandmail.com/news/politics/alberta-pleased-over-nexen-progress-approval-cautiously-eyeslimits-on-future-takeovers/article6126022. 64 Grant Bishop, "Why Canada needs to take the politics out of foreign investment" Globe and Mail, 14 January 2013, online: http://www.globeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/why-canada-needs-totake-the-politics-out-of-foreign-investment/article7339244. Hand-wringing over SOE investment in Canada may be due, in part, to Canada's negative past experience with domestic SOEs, which led to their privatization. 69 This experience has given rise to the concern that SOEs "may have negative effects on the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness" of the Canadian businesses they acquire. 70 Concerns arising from the presumed inefficiency of domestic SOEs do not necessarily apply equally to foreign SOEs. The purpose of domestic SOEs might be to protect the national interest in a particular industry or service, or to create jobs and encourage local economic development. When SOEs operate internationally it seems more likely that they will be purely profit-driven; why make investments abroad except for the purpose of generating returns on investment? 71 This distinction can be seen in the two-fold investment objectives of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, a Canadian public-sector fund manager: "to achieve an optimal return on [investment], while contributing to Québec's economic development." 72 In other words, when investing outside of Québec, the sole investment objective of the Caisse is to generate an "optimal" investment return. This may be why FDI is often criticized and feared on the basis that foreign owners will ruthlessly cut jobs and wages, and show less regard for any negative impacts on the surrounding community. 73 Furthermore, there is no reason to think that SOEs suffer from significantly greater bureaucratic inefficiency, conflicting goals or insufficient incentives to maximize profits than other types of large, multinational enterprises. 65 71 Steger, supra note 36 at 3 ("The evidence so far…is that SWFs are driven principally by investment objectives rather than by policital and strategic calculations."). 72 Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, "Profile of the Caisse", online: http://www.lacaisse.com/en/aboutus/profile. Québec is a province in Canada. 73 Krzepkowski & Mintz, supra note 4 at 8 ("objections to increased foreign control have focused on…concerns that while domestic firms operate in the domestic interest, foreign companies do not."). Although evidence indicates there is no difference between Canadian-owned and foreign-owned corporations in this respect.
Another commonly expressed concern is that a possible motive of SOEs is to gain access to "sensitive" technologies for political, rather than commercial purposes. 74 Concerns about national security are not limited to SOEs, however. In 2007, the Canadian Government rejected a takeover of a division of MacDonald Dettwiler & Associates by privately-owned US firm Alliant Techsystems on the basis of national security concerns. The Canadian government was worried about losing control of "top-secret" satellite images. 75 In the case of a corporation based in a country perceived as hostile to Canada, whether the corporation is state-owned is unlikely to be very relevant to a determination that the investment should be blocked on national security grounds. In any event, national security concerns do not justify blocking all, or even most, investments by SOEs, given the potential costs to the Canadian economy.
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There is a valid concern that corporate assets will be diverted from the business to respond to the wishes of the SOE's home government. The underlying concern is that to the extent an SOE's assets are diverted for public policy purposes, there may not be sufficient capital "to maintain the Canadian business in a globally competitive position." 77 There is some evidence to support this concern. According to Wang, the Chinese government can "make key business decisions for" SOEs in order "to advance…national goals. These factors included "the degree of state control, corporate governance, transparency, shareholder treatment", board independence and "whether the acquired entity will continue to operate on a commercial basis."
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Like the review process generally, the 2007 Guidelines for SOEs were criticized as vague and unclear. 85 Singer and Walker noted that the Guidelines failed even to define what level of ownership would make a corporation an SOE. 86 Some commentators suggested that additional guidelines for SOEs were unnecessary, that the existing net benefit test was broad enough for the Government to take concerns about SOEs into account. 87 Other commentators worried that the 2007 Guidelines would have a "chilling effect" on FDI from emerging economies.
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Despite these concerns, a number of investments by SOEs in Canadian natural resource companies were approved between 2007 and 2012. 89 Then, on December 7, 2012, the Government simultaneously approved two takeovers by SOEs and issued new, stricter Guidelines for SOEs. In his speech announcing these decisions, the Prime Minister of Canada appeared to "all but sla[m] the door" on further FDI by SOEs in Alberta's oil sands, 90 stating that the Nexen and Progress transactions were "the end of a trend", and that "going forward" reviewable investments by SOEs in the oil sands will be found to be of net benefit "only in an exceptional circumstance."
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In addition to taking a strong stand against further acquisitions for control of Canadian oil sands companies by SOEs, the Government also announced that the Minister of Industry will "carefully monitor" proposed SOE transactions in other areas of the Canadian economy. This is to include examination of "the degree of control or influence an SOE would likely exert on the Canadian business that is being acquired; the degree of control or influence an SOE would likely exert on the industry in which the Canadian business operates; and the extent to which a 82 Mandel-Campbell, supra note 1 at 2. 83 VanDuzer, supra note 20 at 248. 84 Herman, supra note 19 at 10. 85 But see Bergevin & Schwanen, supra note 21 at 14 (describing the 2007 Guidelines as "provid[ing] a level of clarity"). 86 Singer & Walker, supra note 44 at 23. 87 VanDuzer, supra note 20 at 253; Bergevin & Schwanen, supra note 21 at 11; Steger, supra note 36 at 9. 88 Steger, ibid at 11. 89 VanDuzer, supra note 20 at 249; Lally et al, supra note 3 at 11. 90 Andrew Coyne, "Stephen Harper's foreign takeover policy no longer just murky, but totally incoherent", National Post, 12 December 2012, online: http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/12/07/andrew-coyne-stephenharpers-foreign-takeover-policy-no-longer-just-murky-but-totally-incoherent/. 91 Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on foreign investment, 7 December 2012, Ottawa, Canada.
13
foreign state is likely to exercise control or influence over the SOE acquiring the Canadian business."
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The new Guidelines define SOE even more broadly than the 2007 Guidelines as "an enterprise that is owned, controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly by a foreign government." 93 It would seem that the addition of "influenced" to the definition is meant to include more than enterprises that are majority-owned by a foreign government, but how far this new, broader category extends is not clear. The Canadian Government could have borrowed the OECD definition, which includes enterprises in which the state has a "significant minority ownership" stake. 94 Assuming the Government was aware of this definition, it would seem that "influenced" is intended either to include an even greater number of enterprises, or to give the Government greater scope to label a foreign corporation as an SOE when it might be politically expedient to do so.
The new Guidelines require SOEs to address, in their plans and undertakings, their "inherent" susceptibility to state influence, by "demonstrate[ing] their strong commitment to transparent and commercial operations." 95 SOEs remain subject to the net benefit test and the list of factors set out above. For SOEs, however, this assessment will incorporate the SOE's "corporate governance and reporting structure"; specifically, whether the SOE "adheres to Canadian standards of corporate governance" with respect to transparency and disclosure, board independence, and treatment of shareholders, and the SOE's adherence to "Canadian laws and practices, including…free market principles." 96 The Guidelines also provide that the Minister will assess whether, following the acquisition by the SOE, certain decisions will continue to be made on a "commercial basis", including not only decisions as to where to export and to process, but also decisions regarding the participation of Canadians in the SOE's operations "in Canada and elsewhere", and levels of research and development in Canada. Finally, the Minister also will consider "the impact of the investment on productivity and industrial efficiency in Canada" and whether the SOE will make "the appropriate level of capital expenditures to maintain the Canadian business in a globally competitive position." 97 The main concern the Guidelines ostensibly address is the concern that managers of SOEs will base decisions on the political priorities of their home state, rather than what the Government of Canada calls a "commercial basis", and that this will reduce productivity and competitiveness of the target Canadian business. 14 The likely overall impact of the current Canadian Government policy is that SOEs will invest their assets elsewhere. Although the Canadian Government has stated that investments by SOEs in non-controlling, minority interests in Canadian businesses "will continue to be welcome", 98 it is unclear why a 'commercially-oriented' SOE (in contrast with a passive investor like a sovereign wealth fund) would be willing to give up the option of acquiring managerial control. Acquirers pay a premium over market price for control for good, commercial reasons. So, while the Canadian Government might continue to welcome "non-controlling investments in the oil sands", 99 it's unclear whether a profit-maximizing SOE would view this as a worthwhile investment.
100

C. Private v. State-ownership: a Principled Distinction?
The policy stance of the Canadian Government, described above, evidences a "clear preference for private foreign investment over investment by SOEs". 101 But is there a principled basis for this preference? Are separate Guidelines for SOEs necessary? Is this preference consistent with Canada's foreign investment review process and the net benefit test? Is distinguishing SOEs from other sources of FDI coherent? My purpose in asking these questions is not to build an argument against the need for review of foreign investment generally, but rather to suggest that there may not be a principled basis for singling out state-owned enterprises for extra scrutiny.
Are distinct Guidelines for SOEs necessary?
The Government of Canada justifies separate Guidelines for SOEs as necessary to protect free market principles. A number of commentators in Canada responded that separate Guidelines were unnecessary, that the factors for assessing "net benefit" are broad enough to take into account any concerns specific to SOEs. In fact, the factors to be considered in assessing net benefit under the SOE Guidelines look a lot like the net benefit test applicable to all reviewable investments; both sets of factors include the potential impact of the investment on productivity levels, the global competitiveness of the Canadian business and the ongoing participation of Canadians in executive positions. Arguably, any concern that SOEs will not operate on a commercial basis could be addressed by any or all of the factors under the existing net benefit test under the Act. Concerns about political interference in the management of the SOE or the Canadian business being acquired could be addressed by (e) -compatibility with policies of the 98 Industry Canada, Press Release: "Government of Canada Releases Policy Statement and Revised Guidelines for Investments by State-Owned Enterprises", 7 December 2012. 99 Lally et al, supra note 3 at 2. They also argue that controlling investments by SOEs in shale gas and liquefied natural gas would be permitted, but these would be subject to review under the new Guidelines. 100 But see ibid at 6-7 (listing SOE investments that were not subject to review under the Act either because they were less than the threshold amount or were for less than one-third voting share). 101 Ibid at 1.
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Canadian Government. Concerns about buying up natural resources and shipping them home at below-market prices could be addressed by (e) and (a) -"the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada." The other point to make here is that Canadian domestic law would apply to Canadian businesses owned by foreign SOEs and these laws also could be used to address these concerns.
It seems strange, also, that the Government would develop its own, unique standards for SOEs, rather than adopt the OECD Guidelines for the Governance of State-owned Enterprises, which deal with concerns around political interference and transparency. The advantage of the OECD Guidelines is that although they discuss things like ensuring that SOEs act on a commercial basis and that they are not given a competitive advantage through access to cheap credit or government guarantees of liability, the OECD Guidelines presume the possibility of states behaving like other significant investors in a company, actively exercising their voting rights and monitoring management in order to ensure a good return on their investment. In a sense, the Guidelines legitimize state-owned enterprises as being able to operate compatibly in a freemarket economy, whereas the Canadian Government's policy questions this possibility. This attitude to FDI by SOEs may prove to be very detrimental to the Canadian economy in the long run.
Are the SOE Guidelines consistent with Canada's approach to FDI generally?
The Government has justified its position on FDI by SOEs as defending private enterprise and free market principles. 102 The problem with this justification is that it is inconsistent with the general approach to the review of foreign investment under the Act. One important principle of a free market, assuming that such a thing exists, is that assets end up in the hands of the party who will generate the greatest value from the asset, on the assumption that this party will pay the highest price for that asset. One concern with respect to SOEs is that access to cheap capital from their home state might allow SOEs to pay a lot of money for assets and then fail to use them to their highest value. 103 The net benefit test has similarly been described as having the effect of substituting "the government's judgement of the proper allocation of resources to those of the players in the market." 104 The Government may have good reasons for such apparent substitutions; nevertheless, the net benefit test demonstrates the hypocrisy inherent in the Government's policy on FDI by SOEs.
Conclusion
There may be some valid concerns arising from significant amounts of foreign investment by SOEs in capitalist economies. "Jittery Western countries", 125 including Canada, should nonetheless ensure that their responses are not simply reactionary and do not create doublestandards for investment by sovereign funds from developing countries that they do not expect to apply to their own funds when investing internationally. The reality is that the largest Chinese enterprises are either wholly or majority owned by the state. 126 The danger with reactionary policies or double-standards is that they may have the effect of raising the cost of capital for Canadian corporations. 127 Or, to put the matter more dramatically, maintaining the current policy could cause Canada to "miss out on the biggest investment boom of this century". 128 The real issues with the development of Alberta's oil sands are not related to foreign ownership, sovereign or otherwise. They stem from mismanagement by the provincial government of both the natural resource and the revenues generated therefrom, 129 and with the massive environmental impact of developing this resource. Both problems are 100% made in Canada. SOEs, however, may form part of the solution. Rather than focusing on potential sources of conflict between Canadian Government policy and Chinese SOEs, greater study should be made of the potential coincidence of interest in environmentally sustainable natural resource development. 130 It is worth asking whether state-owned enterprises may be better able to invest for the long-term and ride out temporary dips in commodity prices without having to scale back development due to short-term cost concerns. 131 Furthermore, in the wake of the financial crisis, Western governments might be well served by some reflection as to whether our standards of corporate governance are really the best ones, or could not be made better. "One thing is for certain…Western governments and financial markets will have to get used to a new breed of investor whose business methods do not necessarily conform to the traditional Western model."
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Given the importance of this issue to Canada's long-term economic prosperity, further research on this topic is desirable. Ideally, this research would involve collaboration with Chinese corporate law scholars who can help to dispel misconceptions and answer questions about the governance of Chinese SOEs. Do they operate independently from government? Is decisionmaking driven primarily by commercial considerations? Are environmental and social responsibilities taken seriously by Chinese SOEs? What about when they operate abroad? Hopefully, research on these questions could help to form the basis of a future, more principled and coherent policy on FDI by SOEs in Canada.
